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Abstract 
In the growth literature, there is a nonlinear relationship between economic 
growth and government size, which is similar to an inverted U-shaped curve. This 
curve can be used to determine the optimum share of government expenditures. 
This paper, using threshold panel approach, attempts to investigate this nonlinear 
effect for 15 European countries, empirically. For the size of government, four 
measures are considered as follows: (i) total expenditures to gross domestic 
product, (ii) final consumption expenditures to gross domestic product, (iii) 
current expenditures other than final consumption to gross domestic product and 
(iv) government gross fixed capital formation to gross domestic product. 
Estimation results show that the inverted U-shaped curve is approved for four 
measures. The estimated optimum shares are 41.7%, 15.8%, 19.4% and 2.5%, 
respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
Do governments have to increase or decrease their costs for higher economic 
growth? Does changing the government cost structure affects economic growth? 
In this paper, these two questions are addressed. Some activities are due to 
government and it can improve other economic activities classified in the 
following two categories: (i) Government must have a role in fields like 
legislation, security of property rights and providing proper environment for 
investment and production through decreasing transaction costs. (ii) Government 
must interfere in other fields sometimes belong to the private sector for playing 
roles and/or giving services. Infrastructures, human force enhancement, public 
health, and education are some examples. One reason is that the private sector 
cannot carry out such duties sufficiently and/or for the total society. 
In general, government can ameliorate economic activity and growth through 
entering sectors in which the market mechanism fails or when it has comparative 
advantage in comparison with the private sector. However, these interferences 
have costs as below: (i) Government does not have a "magic source" of money 
and has to afford its costs through borrowing and taxes. Receiving taxes from 
economic agents makes them discouraged. Borrowing also increases financial 
costs of investments, crowds out private investment and tax increase in future 
(Mitchell, 2005; Gwartney et al., 1998; Ram, 1986). (ii) Market forces bring 
economy to optimality through effective allocation of resources but political 
forces will prevail over market forces in allocating public and private resources 
thus efficiency decreases and less products are produced. Some government 
actions impose heavy costs on productive sectors because of having decision 
making and interference power. Government subsidy payments distort resource 
allocation as well (Mitchell, 2005; Ram, 1986). (iii) Centralization and 
bureaucratic activities decrease creativity in both public and private sectors. In the 
market mechanism, rewards and penalties of decisions are subject to wise choices 
directly, because it will appear in his or her wealth and properties very soon. In 
this mechanism, entrepreneurs are searching for new techniques and technologies 
and are spending their capital on goods and services with the utmost value, which 
causes wealth creation and economic growth. Thus the economic growth is a 
discovery process that is advanced by market mechanism. Government 
interference lessens market mechanism and private decision making which 
decreases economic growth. For example, the consequences of non-optimal 
investments of governmental do not appear rapidly or if they appear, decision 
makers are not punished, so the discovery process of growth is disturbed or made 
slow (Mitchell, 2005; Gwartney et al., 1998; Ram, 1986). 
Therefore, Activities of government have both positive and negative effects 
on economic growth. On one hand, it increases economic growth by providing a 
proper environment for private activities, legislation regarding private possession 
and its guarantee, building infrastructures and public goods. On the other hand, it 
decreases economic growth through borrowing and taxation policies, decreasing 
creativity and increasing inefficiency, in which the intensity of negative effects 
depends on the amount and how to spend this money (types of expenditures). 
Thus, the final effect of government expenditures depends on the kind of 
government expenditures (protection of property rights, subsidies, infrastructures, 
etc.) and its positive or negative effects on economic growth. 
Ghali (1998), Loizides and Vamvoukas (2005) and Wu et al. (2010) show that 
the government size is the Granger cause of economic growth. Guseh (1997), 
Gwartney et al. (1998), Fölster and Henrekson (2001) and Dar and Amirkhalkhali 
(2002) show that the effect of the government size on economic growth is 
negative. Against, theoretical (Barro, 1990; Mourmouras and Lee, 1999; 
Kosempel, 2004) and empirical studies (Ram, 1986; Barro, 1991; Vedder and 
Gallaway, 1998; Chiou-Wei and et al., 2010) show that in the lower levels of 
government activities, the effect of government expenditures is positive but it is 
reversed if it increases, which is shown with an inverted U-shaped curve. This 
curve can be used to determine the optimum share of government expenditures. 
In the mentioned empirical studies, simple linear methods in the form of 
quadratic function are used to test non-linear relationship between economic 
growth and the government size. In this paper, threshold panel approach was used 
to detect linear and non-linear effects of the government size, which leads to more 
reliable results. In addition, the present study considered four measures of 
government expenditures rather than one. They are total government 
expenditures, final consumption expenditures, current expenditures other than 
final consumption and fixed investment expenditures. Then the non-linear effect 
for all of the four measures was considered. 
 In parts 2 and 3, theoretical and empirical studies are expressed, respectively. 
Data and variables are presented in part 4. In part 5, linear estimations of the 
effect of government size on economic growth are discussed. In parts 6 and 7, the 
non-linear method of threshold and its estimation results are presented, 
respectively. In the final part, conclusion and recommendations for future 
research are offered. 
 
 
2. Theoretical literature 
In the growth literature, Barro (1990, 1991) enters the public sector in a 
simple model of endogenous growth. He assumes that government tax incomes 
spent on providing public services, so that all producers have the same share, and 
there is no congest effects. Considering that government spending enter the 
representative firm production function, Barro’s production function is given by 
following AK form: 
𝑌 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾 𝑡 𝛼𝐺 𝑡 1−𝛼  ,                0 < 𝛼 < 1,                                                                                           (1) 
and utility function takes the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
(CIES) form: 
𝑢 𝑐 𝑡   =  
𝑐 𝑡 1−𝜎
1− 𝜎
,            𝜎 > 0  ,𝜎 ≠ 1,
𝐿𝑛 𝑐 𝑡 ,                   𝜎 = 1.               
                                                                                         (2) 
Equilibrium condition is 𝑌 𝑡 ≡ 𝐶 𝑡 + 𝐼 𝑡 + 𝐺 𝑡 . Based on the solution of 
infinite horizon Ramsey model, steady state growth rate is determined by: 
𝑌  𝑡 
𝑌 𝑡 
= 𝜎−1  𝛼 1− 𝜏𝐺 𝐴
1
𝛼 𝜏𝐺
 1−𝛼 
𝛼 − 𝛿 − 𝜌 .                                                                                      3  
Therefore, government size has positive and negative bi-effects on growth rate. α 
is between zero and one, then by increasing the size of government, its positive 
effect on growth rate is decreased. Barro (1988) concludes that "The economy's 
growth rate and saving rate initially rise with the ratio of productive government 
expenditures to GNP, g/y, but each rate eventually reaches a peak and 
subsequently declines" (Fig. 1). Its graph became known as Barro curve, and it is 
a basis for government expenditures optimum determination. Mourmouras and 
Lee (1999) expanded Barro model by combining Barro production function and 
Blanchard overlapping generations model (Barro, 1990, 1991; Blanchard, 1985). 
They considered consumer with limited life horizon and logarithmic utility 
function, 𝑈 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝐿𝑛𝑐 𝑖, 𝑡 
∞
𝑡
𝑒− 𝜌+𝜆  𝑣−𝑡 𝑑𝑣 , and in a more general model concluded 
that Barro’s curve is confirmed. 
 
 Kosempel (2004) expanded Mourmouras and Lee’s model by assuming the 
case in which government spends its expenditures in two ways: (i) Government 
allocates part of its expenditures for providing free services (x) like health, parks, 
museums and art exhibitions that directly enter consumer’s utility function. Utility 
function takes the following CIES form: 
𝑢 𝑐 𝑖, 𝑡  ,𝑥 𝑖, 𝑡  =  
(1 −𝛽)𝑐 𝑖, 𝑡 1−𝜎 + 𝛽𝑥 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1
1 − 𝜎
,            𝜎 > 0  ,𝜎 ≠ 1,
 1− 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 𝑐 𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑛𝑥 𝑖, 𝑡 ,                   𝜎 = 1.               
                             (4)  
 (ii) The other part is spent on providing free services to producers like road 
construction, airports, railways, harbors, R&D and human forces enhancement 
services that enter production function like Barro and Mourmouras and Lee 
models. He assumes that government incomes are derived from proportional 
taxes, and so 𝑋 𝑡 + 𝐺 𝑡 = 𝜏𝑌 𝑡  or 𝜏𝑋 + 𝜏𝐺 = 𝜏. 
Finally, based on solving the optimization problems of consumer with finite 
horizon (𝑈 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑢 𝑐 𝑖, 𝑡  ,𝑥 𝑖, 𝑡  
∞
𝑡
𝑒− 𝜌+𝜆  𝑣−𝑡 𝑑𝑣) and firm with infinite horizon 
(𝜑 𝑡 =    1− 𝜏 𝑌 𝑡 − 𝐼 𝑡 −𝑊 𝑡  
∞
0
𝑒− 𝑟(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑡), the following equations are 
derived   
𝐶  𝑡 
𝐶 𝑡 
= 𝜎−1  𝛼 1− 𝜏 𝐴
1
𝛼 𝜏𝐺
 1−𝛼 
𝛼 − 𝛿 − 𝜌 − 
             𝜆 + 𝜌 +  𝜎 − 1 (𝛼 1− 𝜏 𝐴
1
𝛼 𝜏𝐺
 1−𝛼 
𝛼 − 𝛿 + 𝜆)𝜆𝐶  𝑡 −1 𝜎−1 ,                                         5  
𝐾  𝑡 
𝐾 𝑡 
=
1
𝛼
 𝛼 1− 𝜏 𝐴
1
𝛼 𝜏𝐺
 1−𝛼 
𝛼 − 𝛿 − 𝛿 − 𝐶  𝑡 ,                                                                              6  
where 𝐶  𝑡  is consumption-capital ratio and 
d  
𝐾  𝑡 
𝐾 𝑡 
 
dτx
< 0,             
d  
𝐶  𝑡 
𝐶 𝑡 
 
dτx
 < 0,             
d  
𝐾  𝑡 
𝐾 𝑡 
 
dτG
≷ 0,              
d  
𝐶  𝑡 
𝐶 𝑡 
 
dτG
 ≷ 0. 
The first two derivatives are negative, but the other ones are ambiguous. 
Kosempel (2004) indicated that the steady state growth rate is determined 
according to the following equation 
𝑌  𝑡 
𝑌 𝑡 
=
𝐶  𝑡 
𝐶 𝑡 
=
𝐾  𝑡 
𝐾 𝑡 
.                                                                                                                                      7  
Now the existence of Barro’s curve can be investigated in two cases: a) 
Assume that 𝜏𝑋 and thereby 𝜏 is increased. In this condition, according to Eq. (7), 
steady state growth rate is decreased. b) But assume that 𝜏𝐺 and so 𝜏 is increased. 
In this condition, Eqs. (5) to (7) imply that the steady state growth rate depends on 
 1− 𝛼  1− 𝜏𝑋 − 𝜏𝐺. Steady state growth rate is increased if this expression is 
positive, and is decreased if it is negative. By increasing 𝜏𝐺, the expression 
 1− 𝛼  1− 𝜏𝑋 − 𝜏𝐺 will be negative if 0 < 𝛼 < 1. The latter expenditures follow 
Barro’s curve, while the former expenditures always have negative effects on 
economic growth. 
 
3. Empirical studies 
There are many empirical studies concerning the government size or the 
government expenditures share of total production. Ram (1986) using cross-
sectional data and separate time series for 115 developing (those with market 
economy) and developed countries concluded that the finding of time series are 
consistent with cross-sectional results and the overall effect of government size on 
economic growth is positive in almost all cases. Guseh (1997) using fixed effects 
method for 59 middle-incomes developing countries (1984 classification of World 
Bank), concluded that the effect of government size on economic growth is 
negative. He took the share of total government spending in GDP as an index for 
the government size. 
Ghali (1998) with government expenditures share of GDP for 10 countries of 
OECD concluded that the government size influences an economic growth 
directly or indirectly (via investment and trade). Vedder and Gallaway (1998) 
calculated optimum government expenditures for USA, Canada, Britain, Italy, 
Sweden and Denmark based on Armey curve (1995). They estimated a quadratic 
function for each country with independent variables of the government size and 
square government size and dependent variable of economic growth. According 
to their results, the optimum expenditures are 17.45%, 21.37%, 20.97%, 22.23%, 
19.43% and 26.14% for these countries respectively. Gwartney et al. (1998) took 
the total government expenditures to GDP proportion as an index for the 
government size. They studied the US, 23 countries of OECD and 60 countries of 
less developed with high income levels and concluded that the government size 
effect is negative in all three cases. 
Fölster and Henrekson (2001) considered two indices for the government size: 
total tax share of GDP and total government expenditures share of GDP. They 
took two groups of countries and concluded that this negative effect is certified by 
the second index only, but in non-OEDC by both two indices. In this research, the 
panel extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is used. Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002) with 
the government expenditures to GDP index for 19 countries of OECD concluded 
that the government size has negative effect on economic growth. Loizides and 
Vamvoukas (2005) with the share of total expenditure in GNP as index of 
government size for Greece, UK and Ireland concluded that in all three countries 
government size is the Granger cause of economic growth in short term (all three 
countries) and long term (Ireland and UK). Mitchell (2005) studied the 
government expenditures and economic growth trend in the US and 15 European 
countries. The results show that the expansion of government expenditures does 
not necessarily improve economic activities.  
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) using various indices concluded that 
government consumption expenditures and direct tax have negative effect but the 
public investment share has positive effect on economic growth. This research 
was done for 15 European countries with cointegration panel method. Chiou-Wei 
et al. (2010) investigated the nonlinear effect of government size on economic 
growth in South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia. They used the 
share of government expenditures in GDP as an index for government size. The 
optimum size was estimated by Solow growth model and a dynamic STAR model 
for South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand (nonlinear effect did not 
approved for Malaysia) as 10.8%, 11%, 15.9% and 10.8%, respectively (of 
course, nonlinear relationship was estimated as U-shape for Singapore). Wu et al. 
(2010), using the panel Granger causality for 182 countries, concluded that there 
is a bilateral relation between economic growth and government size. They 
considered all countries, OECD countries, non-OECD countries, high-income 
countries, middle-income countries, low-income countries, high-corruption and 
low-corruption countries. They concluded that bi-directional causality is 
confirmed in all groups except low-income countries. 
There are researches about the government size on the basis of non-economic 
criteria. De Witte and Moesen (2009) determined factors affecting the 
government size like country size, economic growth, Wagner’s law, urbanization 
and family size and estimated optimum government size for 23 OEDC countries 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA). Davies (2009) considered government 
consumption expenditures as a share of GDP and government investment 
expenditures as a share of GDP and used human development index to determine 
the optimum amount of them. He selected 154 high and low-income countries and 
determined the optimum expenditures for 5 years (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2002). A second order function with dependent variable of HDI (instead of 
economic growth rate) is estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM) 
and then it was used to estimate the optimum value of government size. This 
research has two results: first, the optimum share of consumption and investment 
expenditures are 17% and 13% in high-income countries, respectively. Second, in 
low-income countries, consumption expenditures always have positive effect 
while investment expenditures have negative effect (-40%). In these countries, a 
clear optimum level is not defined yet. 
 
4. Data 
Total government expenditures are divided to current and capital 
expenditures. Current expenditures are divided to final consumption expenditures 
and other current expenditures. The government expenditures that are spent for 
providing goods and services are called the final consumption expenditures. The 
second part of current spending contains social transfers other than social 
transfers provided to households via market producers, subsides, etc. Capital 
expenditures contain two parts: gross government fixed capital formation 
(tangible properties like infrastructures and intangible properties like computer 
software) and other capital expenditures (like the change in inventories of 
government sector, precious stones and metals, etc.). 
Four measures for government expenditures are selected here: (i) Total 
government expenditures to product, (ii) Final consumption expenditures to 
product, (iii) Current expenditures other than final consumption expenditures to 
product, (iv) Fixed investment expenditures to product. In the majority of 
empirical studies, as mentioned in section 3, the second measure and sometimes 
the forth one has been used. The present study has investigated the Barro curve 
for all four measures mentioned above. 
15 European countries of OECD and members of European Union to 1995 
include Austria (1995), Belgium (1952), Denmark (1973), Finland (1995), France 
(1952), Germany (1952), Greece (1981), Ireland (1973), Italy (1952), 
Luxembourg (1952), Netherlands (1952), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Sweden 
(1995) and United Kingdom (1973). The data are from the WDI and AMECO. 
The four measures (at current prices in Local Currency Unit) are as follows: 
(i) TE: total current and investment expenditures proportion to GDP. 
(ii) FCE: final consumption expenditures proportion to GDP. 
(iii) OCE: current expenditures other than final consumption proportion to GDP. 
(iv) GFCF: gross fixed capital formation of government proportion to GDP. 
 
5. Linear Estimations results 
In this study, panel approach is used for estimation. Economic (resource 
endowment such as labor force and natural, physical and human capitals, financial 
system and economic freedom), social and political structures may be different in 
countries under the study. Individual-specific effects method is used to take into 
consideration these differences. In addition, the estimation results of panel data 
compare to cross-sectional or time-series data are more reliable (Baltagi, 2008).  
Based on the theoretical (Solow, 1956; Barro, 1990; Mourmouras and Lee, 
1999; Kosempel, 2004) and empirical growth literature (Solow, 1957; Barro, 
1991; Ram, 1986; Guseh, 1997; Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008), the following 
growth regression is specified for estimation: 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                          8  
where GGDP is growth rate of real gross domestic product (in constant 2000 US 
dollar), LAB is labor growth rate, INV is gross fixed investment proportion to 
GDP (in constant 2000 US dollar), EXP and IMP are growth rate of exports and 
imports of goods and services, respectively (in constant 2000 US dollar), and 
finally, GOV is government size that can be one of the four TE, FCE, OCE or 
GFCF. So, four measures can be considered (as shown in Table 1). Model (1) and 
(4) face up to the problem of multicollinearity. In model (1), TE contains fixed 
government investment, and therefore there is multicollinearity between TE and 
INV. In model (4), GFCF is government investment itself, and then there is 
multicollinearity between GFCF and INV. In models (1) and (4), due to prevent 
multicollinearity, INV (gross fixed investment to GDP) is replaced with private 
fixed investment to GDP (in other words, in these models, INV is private gross 
fixed capital formation to GDP). 
 
 
Table 1 
Different models of government size 
Measure (1)
a 
(2)
b 
(3)
a 
(4)
a 
GOV TE FCE OCE GFCF 
Min-Max [31.58   64.82] [12.9   29.9] [13.24   31.54] [0.68   4.30] 
Period 1995-2005 1981-2005 1995-2005 1995-2005 
Countries 15
 
15 15
 
15
 
Observations 165 375 165 165 
Source: 
a
 AMECO and 
b
 WDI 
 
At first, the panel unit root tests of LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) and IPS 
(Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) are performed for two relatively stable periods of 
1995-2005 and 1981-2005. The results show that all variables are stationary 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2  
Panel unit root tests 
Measure (1), (3), (4) [1995-2005] (2) [1981-2005] 
 LLC IPS LLC IPS 
 no 
trend 
trend no trend trend no trend trend no trend trend 
GGDP -4.4*** -5.9*** -1.9** 1.0 -5.4*** -3.9*** -7.1*** -6.2*** 
LAB -11*** -13*** -7.0*** -4.6*** -13*** -12*** 13*** -12*** 
INV -2.3** -6.5*** -0.4 -1.2 -2.3** -2.3** -3.2*** -3.6*** 
INVP
a 
-2.1** -4.5*** -0.6 -0.3     
EXP -7.5*** -9.1*** -3.8*** -2.5*** -10*** -10*** -9.0*** -8.0*** 
IMP -6.7*** -9.0*** -3.7*** -2.7*** -10*** -9.0*** -11*** -7.8*** 
TE -6.0*** -2.7*** -1.6* 1.9     
FCE     -1.8** -0.8 -2.6*** -1.5* 
OCE -7.7*** -1.9** -2.8*** 2.2     
GFCF -6.8*** -6.8*** -4.1*** -1.8**     
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% levels. 
a
: INVP is private gross 
fixed capital formation to GDP. 
 
In order to select fixed or random individual effects, Hausman test based on 
linear regression (8) is done. The null hypothesis is that there is no dependency 
between explanatory variables and disturbances. With model of fixed individual 
effects, the estimators under the null and alternative hypotheses are consistent but 
estimators of random effects will be consistent under the null one. So if null 
hypothesis is rejected, fixed effects must be used (Baltagi, 2008). The Hausman 
test result shows that the null hypothesis is rejected with 99% confidence in all 
models and so fixed effects must be used. According to linear regression 
estimations with fixed individual effects, total expenditures (TE), the current 
expenditures other than final expenditures (OCE) and government gross fixed 
capital formation expenditures (GFCF) do not have effects on economic growth, 
and only the effect of final expenditures share (FCE) is significant and negative 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Linear regression results 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
α0 
-5.383 
(2.747)* 
5.161 
(1.669)*** 
-5.634 
(2.386)** 
-3.010 
(1.275)** 
α1 
0.084 
(0.085) 
0.224 
(0.073)*** 
0.086 
(0.085) 
-0.086 
(0.086) 
α2 
0.278 
(0.071)*** 
0.079 
(0.037)** 
0.276 
(0.071)*** 
0.240 
(0.064)*** 
α3 
0.126 
(0.032)*** 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.128 
(0.032)*** 
0.128 
(0.032)*** 
α4 
0.083 
(0.033)** 
0.208 
(0.018)*** 
0.082 
(0.033)** 
0.086 
(0.033)*** 
α5 
0.042 
(0.040) 
-0.282 
(0.063)*** 
0.067 
(0.055) 
0.107 
(0.255) 
Hausman test 47.33*** 42.61*** 41.55*** 36.76*** 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% levels. 
 
6. Threshold non-linear method 
As discussed earlier, the government effect on economic growth may be 
nonlinear (like Barro curve). To test and estimate nonlinearity effects, the 
threshold panel method is used. Hansen (1999) suggests this method with fixed 
individual effects that is used here. On the one hand, using panel data approach, 
can lead to more reliable results than cross-sectional and time-series data. On the 
other hand, using a threshold approach, the existence and significance of the 
threshold can be tested. 
First, existence of the threshold(s), or breakdown(s), is tested. If I(.) is an 
index function and parameter(s) of γ shows threshold(s), its regressions are shown 
below. 
Single threshold regression: 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛿1 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡   I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≤ γ1 +  𝛿2 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡   I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 > γ1 
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                                         (9) 
Double threshold regression: 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛿1 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡  I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≤ γ1 
+  𝛿2 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡   I γ1 < 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≤ γ2 
+  𝛿3 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡   I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 > γ2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .                                          10  
In general, regression with J thresholds is as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛿1 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡   I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≤ γ1 
+   𝛿𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡  I γj−1 < 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≤ γj 
𝐽−1
𝑗=2
+  𝛿𝐽 + 𝛽𝐽𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡  I 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 > γJ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .                                          (11) 
Threshold approach suggests minimizing sum of squared residuals that are 
obtained from a consistent estimation (Chan, 1993). For simplicity, assume that 
thresholds are estimated from smallest to largest: 
𝛾 1 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛   𝑆1 γ1 ,                                                                                                       
𝛾 2 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛   𝑆2 
 𝛾2 𝛾 1 ,                                                                                               
⋮ 
𝛾 𝐽 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛   𝑆𝐽  
 𝛾𝐽  𝛾 1,… , 𝛾 𝐽−1 .                                                                              (12) 
According to Eqs. (9)-(11) the hypothesis testing for presence of threshold(s) 
(for each of the cases above) can be shown as below: 
𝛾1 :𝐻0
1 :𝛽1 = 𝛽2,                                   𝐻1
1: 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ,                                                         
𝛾2:𝐻0
2:𝛽2 = 𝛽3,                                  𝐻1
2:𝛽2 ≠ 𝛽3,                                                       
⋮ 
𝛾𝐽 :𝐻0
𝐽
:𝛽𝐽−1 = 𝛽𝐽 ,                               𝐻1
𝐽
:𝛽𝐽−1 ≠ 𝛽𝐽 .                                                   (13) 
These hypotheses must be tested while the null hypothesis is not rejected. If 
the i-th null hypothesis is not rejected, the i-th threshold, γi, is not significant and 
the model has only threshold of i-1. The Fi test for i-th null hypothesis, i-th 
threshold, is done: 
𝐹1 =
𝑆0 − 𝑆1 𝛾 1 
𝜎 1
2 ,                                                                                                            
𝐹2 =
𝑆1 𝛾 1 − 𝑆2 
 𝛾 2 𝛾 1 
𝜎 2
2 ,                                                                                              
⋮ 
𝐹𝐽 =
𝑆𝐽−1 
 𝛾 𝐽−1 𝛾 1 ,… , 𝛾 𝐽−2 − 𝑆𝐽  
 𝛾 𝐽  𝛾 1 ,… , 𝛾 𝐽−1 
𝜎 𝐽
2 .                                                 (14) 
S0 is regression residuals sum of squares and variances are defined as follows: 
𝜎 1
2 =
1
𝑁(𝑇 − 1)
𝑆1 𝛾 1 ,  
𝜎 2
2 =
1
𝑁 𝑇 − 1 
𝑆2 
 𝛾 2 𝛾 1 , 
⋮ 
𝜎 𝐽
2 =
1
𝑁 𝑇 − 1 
𝑆𝐽  
 𝛾 𝐽  𝛾 1,… , 𝛾 𝐽−1 .                                                                             (15) 
Fi distribution is non-standard and depends on the moments of sample, and so 
the critical values cannot be tables (Hansen, 1996). So following the suggestion of 
Hansen (1997, 1999, 2000), the bootstrap procedure is used: (i) First, through 
minimizing the sum of squares of sample residuals, coefficients are estimated. (ii) 
Based on sample residuals distribution, a new sample under null hypothesis is 
produced. The independent variables are non-random and do not vary, and just the 
dependent variable is reproduced. (iii) With the new sample, the coefficients are 
estimated (under the null and alternative hypotheses) and the simulated Fi statistic 
is obtained. (iv) The process is repeated and using the simulated statistics, the 
critical values are calculated. The p-value based on the number of simulated 
statistics exceeds actual estimation of F is calculated. 
Then the confidence intervals based on likelihood ratio test are made. 
Consistent estimations are obtained by minimizing the residuals sum of squares 
but the asymptotic distributions of estimators are non-standard. Hansen (1999) 
suggests using the likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio is estimated for 
different threshold values under the null hypothesis. For single threshold: 
𝐻0
1 : 𝛾1 = 𝛾1
∗,                                                                                                                       
𝐿𝑅1 𝛾1 =
 𝑆1 𝛾1 − 𝑆1 𝛾 1  
𝜎 1
2 .                                                                                    (16) 
For two thresholds: 
𝐻0
2: 𝛾2 = 𝛾2
∗ ,          𝐻0
1 : 𝛾1 = 𝛾1
∗ , 
𝐿𝑅2 𝛾 =
 𝑆2 
 𝛾2 𝛾 1 − 𝑆2 
 𝛾 2 𝛾 1  
𝜎 2
2 ,  𝐿𝑅1 𝛾 =
 𝑆1 
 𝛾1 𝛾 2 − 𝑆1 
 𝛾 1 𝛾 2  
𝜎 2
2 .     (17) 
The same process can be done for more than two thresholds. Hansen (1999, 2000) 
shows that the likelihood statistics tend to converge to a random variable in 
distribution with the following reverse distribution function: 
𝐿𝑅 𝛾 
𝑑
 𝜉,             𝑃 𝜉 ≤ 𝑥 =  1 − 𝑒−
𝑥
2 
2
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 𝑐 𝛼 = −2 log 1 −  1 − 𝛼 .                                                                                      (19) 
By replacing the percentage of significance level (for example, 5%) in Eq. (19), 
the critical value of likelihood statistic is calculated. Likelihood ratio for each of 
actual thresholds under the null hypothesis is calculated and then based on the 
inequality 𝐿𝑅1 ≤ 𝑐 𝛼 , α% confidence interval is calculated. It should be noted 
that the hypothesis 𝐻0 :𝛽1 = 𝛽2 is different from the hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 𝛾0. The 
𝐹1  statistic is for testing the presence of the threshold, while the 𝐿𝑅1  statistic is 
used for constructing the confidence interval for the present threshold. 
 
7. Non-linear estimations results 
The results are shown in Table 4. The bootstrap was repeated for 10000 times 
for each model and then the critical values and p-values were calculated. The 
existence of one threshold for each of the four measures is confirmed. The second 
threshold in regressions (2) and (4) is not confirmed at 10% level, but in 
regressions (1) and (3), it is certified. In regression (3), the third threshold is even 
significant, but the direction does not change and just the intensity changes 
slightly, which is insignificant. In 1-th threshold, smallest one, the effect changed 
from positive to negative so these thresholds are regarded as optimum amounts. 
Albeit for the exact estimation of all coefficients, the second threshold in 
regressions (1) and (3) are considered (change in direction and intensity in Table 
4 is quite obvious). 
 
Table 4 
Threshold test 
Measure (1) (2) (3) (4) 
F1 20.363*** 29.693*** 23.953*** 7.081* 
Critical values
 
8.4, 11.0, 17.2
 
7.9, 10.3, 16.1 8.2, 10.9, 17.0 6.1, 8.1, 12.6 
Bootstrap p-value 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.071 
F2 10.468*** 8.824 6.301** 3.832 
Critical values 4.2, 5.5, 8.8 9.4, 12.0, 18.3 4.3, 5.7, 9.0 7.4, 9.7, 15.4 
Bootstrap p-value 0.005 0.113 0.037 0.286 
F3 5.512  8.701**  
Critical values 9.7, 12.1, 17.9  5.0, 6.7, 10.8  
Bootstrap p-value 0.277  0.022  
F4   2.965  
Critical values   3.4, 4.4, 6.9  
Bootstrap p-value   0.134  
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% levels. 
 
In Table 5, the optimum amount of the four measures and their confidence 
intervals are shown. The optimum share of total expenditures (TE), the optimum 
share of final consumption expenditures (FCE), the optimum share of current 
expenditures other than final consumptions (OCE) and the optimum share of 
government fixed investment (GFCF) are estimated 41.7%, 15.8%, 19.4% and 
2.5%, respectively. The sum of the optimum share of current expenditures 
(19.4%+15.8%) with the optimum share of fixed investment expenditures (2.5%) 
will be 37.7%, and the optimum share of total expenditures is 41.7%. Therefore, 
there is 3% different between 41.7% and 37.7%. Total expenditures comprise 
current and capital expenditures. The capital expenditures comprise fixed 
investment expenditures and non-fixed capital expenditures (or other capital 
expenditures). The non-fixed capital expenditures comprise change in inventories 
of government sector, precious stones and metals, etc., having a 1% to 3% share 
of GDP. Adding the share of non-fixed capital expenditures (with 37.7%), the 
share of total expenditures will be almost 41.7%. Therefore, there is no 
remarkable difference and the results are consistent. 
 
 
Table 5 
The optimum size of government 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GOV TE FCE OCE GFCF 
Optimum Size 41.7% 15.8% 19.4% 2.5% 
(1-th threshold)     
Confidence Intervals    
99% 
 
[41.7    41.7] [15.8    15.8] [16.3    20.0] [1.2    2.6] 
95%
 
[36.0    43.6] [15.8    16.0] [16.3    20.1] [1.2    3.6] 
90%
 
[36.0    44.0] [14.0    16.0] [16.3    21.4] [1.2    3.6] 
2-th threshold  51.9%  25.1%  
3-th threshold   22.8%  
 
Regressions (1) and (3) with Eq. (10) and regressions (2) and (4) with Eq. (9) 
are estimated (Table 6). Considering the threshold(s), the significance of 
coefficients improves, and especially the coefficients of government expenditures 
share are significant before and after the threshold. The optimum share of total 
expenditures was estimated 41.7%. If total expenditures share is below the 
optimum, an increase in TE will have a meaningful positive effect on economic 
growth but the effect is negative if it is above the optimum. After the 51.9% level, 
the second threshold, TE has no meaningful effect. Based on these estimations, 
1% increase in TE causes 0.4% increase in economic growth but after the 
optimum level 1%, increase in TE causes 2% decrease in economic growth 
averagely. The word averagely is important because change in the share of total 
expenditures depends on whether these changes have happened on which kind of 
expenditures and their combination (β1, β2 and β3 in regression (1)). 
The optimum share of final consumption expenditures is estimated 15.8%. 
Both of the coefficients before and after the threshold are significant at 1% level. 
Before the threshold, 1% increase in FCE causes 0.9% increase in economic 
growth but after that 1% increase causes 0.4% increase in economic growth (β1 
and β2 in regression (2)). The optimum share of current expenditures other than 
final consumptions is estimated 19.4%, for which the direction of effect is 
reversed after the threshold. Before the optimum level, 1% increase in OCE 
causes 0.7% increase and after it 0.3% decrease in economic growth. Of course, 
after the second threshold, 25.1%, coefficient of OCE is insignificant (β1, β2 and 
β3 in regression (3)). Government fixed investment optimum share is estimated 
2.5%, then before the optimum level with 1% increase in GFCF, causes 1% 
increase and after it with no effect on economic growth (β1 and β2 in regression 
(4)). 
 
Table 6 
Threshold regression results 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
α1 0.085 
(0.080) 
0.239 
(0.070)*** 
0.070 
(0.079) 
0.087 
 (0.085) 
α2 0.296 
(0.070)*** 
0.071 
(0.036)** 
0.373 
(0.073)*** 
0.247 
(0.063)*** 
α3 0.110 
(0.031)*** 
0.032 
(0.019)* 
0.123 
(0.030)*** 
0.120 
 (0.032)*** 
α4 0.093 
(0.031)*** 
0.198 
(0.017)*** 
0.072 
(0.031)** 
0.085 
 (0.032)*** 
δ1 -17.657 
(4.729)*** 
-11.345 
(3.460)*** 
-17.625 
(3.857)*** 
-4.384 
 (1.478)*** 
δ2 4.247 
(4.138) 
8.279 
(1.937)*** 
-0.077 
(4.022) 
-3.449 
 (1.598)** 
δ3 -7.226 
(3.409)** 
 
-7.742 
(2.552)*** 
 
ß1 0.379 
(0.099)*** 
0.891 
(0.226)*** 
0.666 
(0.149)*** 
1.005 
 (0.484)** 
ß2 -0.171 
(0.077)** 
-0.421 
(0.079)*** 
-0.265 
(0.146)* 
0.157 
 (0.371) 
ß3 0.066 
(0.054) 
 
0.064 
(0.70) 
 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% levels. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This research has four main results:  
(i) In all of the 15 European countries, the effects of government expenditures 
on economic growth are nonlinear which is confirmed based on all measures of 
TE (total expenditures to GDP), FCE (final consumption expenditures to GDP), 
OCE (current expenditures other than final consumption to GDP) and finally 
GFCF (gross fixed capital formation of governmental to GDP). In the previous 
empirical studies, the second measure and sometimes the forth one has been used. 
Increasing government expenditures causes economic growth up to a certain level 
but the effect will be negative beyond it. Therefore, the Barro curve is confirmed 
based on all four measures. Then the optimum expenditures level can be 
determined by this curve, which helps countries with their budgetary policies. The 
optimum share of final consumption expenditures and other current expenditures 
(FCE, OCE) are calculated 15.8% and 19.4%, respectively. FCE is calculated in 
this study is close to previous research. According to results of Vedder and 
Gallaway (1998), the optimum final consumption expenditures are 17.45%, 
21.37%, 20.97%, 22.23%, 19.43% and 26.14% for USA, Canada, Britain, Italy, 
Sweden and Denmark, respectively. Also based on the HDI, Davies (2009) 
calculated optimum share of expenditures in high-income countries that 
approximately is 17%. Government fixed capital formation expenditures share is 
calculated 2.5% and with the share of 1-3% for non-fixed capital expenditures, the 
sum of these four expenditures mentioned will be almost 41.7%.  
(ii) Before the optimum level, the fixed investment share has the most positive 
effect on economic growth with a 1 to 1 relation. After the optimum level, the 
share of final consumption expenditures has the most negative effect with a 2 to 1 
relation. As different expenditures have different effects, change in the budget 
combination can increase or lessen economic growth even if the share of total 
expenditures is constant. As in none of the 15 European countries, the 
consumption expenditures share is not less than the optimum level, so the share of 
final consumption expenditures increase together with other expenditure decrease 
(other current expenditures and/or investment expenditures) causes increase in 
economic growth. 
(iii) In figure 2, the four measures are shown for 15 European countries during 
2001-2005 in which for eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden), the total expenditures share is almost 10% more 
than 41.7%. In these countries, FCE and OCE are 5% more than the optimum 
level. In four countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany), the share of 
investment expenditures is almost 1% less than the optimum share, 2.5%, while in 
the other four countries (Finland, France, Italy, Sweden), this share is at 
maximum 1% more than 2.5%. Therefore, these eight countries can reach higher 
economic growth by decreasing the current expenditures and increasing 
investment expenditures. In 6 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany), 
the total expenditures share is equal to the optimum but in some countries the 
combination is not optimum. In 3 countries (Finland, France, Italy, Sweden), the 
final consumption expenditures is 5% more than the optimum level. In six 
countries (Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom), 
the share of investment expenditures is 3% to 4% (except in the UK which is 
almost 1% less than the optimum level). Only in Ireland, the total expenditures 
are less than the optimum share remarkably (which is 8% less than optimum 
share) which pertains to current expenses other than final consumption. It means 
that the share of current expenditures other than final consumptions is 7% less 
than the optimum level. 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 2. Mean of different expenditures in 15 European countries during 2001-2005 
 
(iv) According to Kosempel model (in section 2), theoretically, the Barro curve is 
only approved for expenditures in providing free services to producers. 
Meanwhile expenditures for providing free services to consumers always have a 
negative effect on economic growth. However, in section 7, the non-linear effects 
for both current and capital expenditures were confirmed. Are these results 
contradictory? First, government activities have both positive and negative effects 
(they are described in section 1). These effects are for all of the kinds of 
expenditures (expenditures for providing free services to producers/consumers 
and current/capital expenditures) although with different intensities. Therefore, 
the final effect of government expenditures depends on the kinds and amount of 
government expenditures. As these expenditures increase, the negative effects are 
0
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expected to increase that may create a non-linear relation between government 
and economic growth. Second, budget classification in Kosempel model (the kind 
of user groups: consumers and producers) is different from the common budget 
classification (current and capital). In Kosempel model, expenditures for 
providing free services to producers were regarded as effective expenditures, and 
enter the production function and affect the economic growth directly, while 
expenditures to construct parks and museums are consumer services expenditures 
and enter consumer utility function. But in budget classification, non-capital 
expenditures like education or human forces enhancement expenditure, are 
considered in current budget, and capital expenditures whether for roads and 
harbors or parks and museums are considered as capital expenditures. Thus, 
budget classification that was used in this research and many others is not an 
accurate classification based on the user groups (although it can be said that 
current expenditures mainly pertain to consumers and capital expenditures mainly 
pertain to producers). Such questions can be discussed in future researches. 
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